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SHIPPING CASUALTIES.

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(LOSS OF THE STEAMSHIP "FALABA.")

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REPORT of a Formal Investigation into the circumstances attending the foundering on 28th March of the British Steamship "Falaba," of Liverpool, in or near Latitude 51° 30' N., Longitude 6° 36' W., whereby loss of life ensued.

Presented to both Houses of Parliament by Command of His Majesty.



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Report on the Loss of the “FALABA” (s.s.)

THE MERCHANT SHIPPING ACTS, 1894 TO 1906.

IN THE MATTER OF the Formal Investigation held at the Caxton Hall, Westminster, on the 20th, 21st, 27th and 28th May, 1915, before the Right Honourable LORD MERSEY, Wreck Commissioner, assisted by Admiral Sir F. S. INGLEFIELD, K.C.B.; Lieutenant-Commander HEARN; Captain D. DAVIES; and Captain J. SPEDDING, acting as Assessors, into the circumstances attending the loss of the steamship “Falaba,” of Liverpool, and the loss of 104 lives in or near latitude 51° 30' N., longitude 6° 36' W. on the 28th March, 1915.

REPORT OF THE COURT.

The Court, having carefully enquired into the circumstances of the above-mentioned shipping casualty, finds, for the reasons appearing in the annex hereto, that the loss of the said ship and lives was due to damage caused to the said ship by a torpedo fired by a submarine of German nationality, whereby the ship sank. In the opinion of the Court the act was done not merely with the intention of destroying the ship but also with the intention of sacrificing life.

Dated this 8th day of July, 1915.

MERSEY,

Wreck Commissioner.

We concur in the above Report,

F. S. INGLEFIELD.

H. J. HEARN.

DAVID DAVIES.

JOHN SPEDDING.

Assessors.

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ANNEX TO THE REPORT.

INTRODUCTION.

On the 3rd May, 1915, the Lord Chancellor appointed a Wreck Commissioner under the Merchant Shipping Acts, and, on the 18th May, the Home Secretary appointed four assessors. On the 4th of May the Board of Trade required that a Formal Investigation of the circumstances attending the loss of the "Falaba" should be held, and the Court accordingly commenced to sit on the 20th May, 1915. There were four public sittings, at which 46 witnesses were examined and a number of documents were produced. The twenty-five questions formulated by the Board of Trade, which are set out in detail hereinafter, appear to cover all the circumstances to be enquired into.

BUILDING, OWNERSHIP, AND MANAGEMENT OF THE "FALABA."

The "Falaba" was a screw steamer, built in the year 1906 by Messrs. Stephens and Sons, of Glasgow, for the Elder Line, Limited. She was intended for the West African trade.

Her managers were Elder Dempster and Company, Limited, of which Company Mr. John Craig was (and is) the Liverpool Managing Director. His name stands on the ship's register as the Managing Owner.

Captain William Peter Thompson is, and for 17 years has been, Marine Superintendent to Elder Dempster and Company. He had general authority to issue instructions regarding the equipment of the vessel.

Dimensions and equipment.

The "Falaba" was of 4,806 tons gross and 3,011 tons net register. Her length was 380 feet and her nominal horse power 654.

She was a liner fitted for passengers and cargo.

She carried four life-boats, numbered 1, 2, 3 and 4, which had been built for the vessel by Messrs. Stephens and Sons in 1906. She also carried three other life-boats more strongly built and intended to serve as surf-boats on the African coast. These were numbered 5, 6 and 8. Number 5 had been built in 1911 and numbers 6 and 8 as recently as 1913. The seven life-boats had accommodation for 282 persons. In addition to these life-boats there was the Captain's gig (No. 7), which was designed to carry 25 persons. Thus the boat accommodation on board was sufficient for 307 persons. On the voyage in question the "Falaba" carried 242 persons in all.

In addition to the boats the vessel was furnished with 12 life-buoys and 301 life-jackets, 19 of which were for children.

Surveys, &c.

On the 21st December, 1914, Mr. Thomas Miller, Board of Trade Surveyor of Liverpool, surveyed the "Falaba" for the purpose of enabling her to obtain a renewal of her passenger certificate. He gave evidence at the Enquiry and satisfied me that at the time of his inspection the life-boats, the life-buoys and the belts were in sound condition and fit for the intended service. Having completed his survey he made the declaration required by the Board of Trade, and on the faith of it the Board issued a twelve months' certificate dated the 22nd December, 1914, by which the "Falaba" was authorised to carry 118 first-class and 72 second-class passengers and a crew of 92, making a total of 282 persons.

In addition to this official survey the life-belts were inspected at Liverpool upon the sailing of the vessel, and at the same time the boats were also examined by the ship's carpenter and found to be in good condition.

I am satisfied that when the "Falaba" started on the voyage in question in this enquiry the boats and the life-saving appliances were all in good order and condition, and complied with the requirements of the law.

The Position of the Boats on leaving Liverpool.

When the "Falaba" left the Mersey on the 27th March, 1915, the life-boats were disposed as follows: Nos. 1, 3 and 5 (the last-mentioned being a surf life-boat) were on the starboard side of the boat deck; Nos. 2, 4 and 6 (the last-mentioned being a surf-boat) were on the port side. No. 8 (a surf life-boat) was on the starboard side, and the Captain's gig (No. 7) on the port side of the poop or after boat deck.

Nos. 1, 2, 3 and 4 (the large life-boats), and No. 7, the captain's gig, were swung out before the pilot left the "Falaba" on the evening of the 27th March when she sailed. The surf life-boats 5, 6 and 8 were not swung out.

The launching apparatus consisted of Welin Patent Davits.

Boat Lists and Boat Drill.

It is the practice on the steamers of the Elder Dempster Line to prepare boat lists for each voyage assigning to each member of the crew a particular boat to which he must go in case of need. This list cannot be prepared until the vessel has left the port of departure, for not until then is it known which of the crew will join the ship. Not infrequently some of them fail to appear. On this occasion the vessel, having left the dock and entered the river, began her voyage at 6 p.m. on Saturday, the 27th March, and apparently the purser commenced the preparation of the boat list next morning at 10.30 a.m. It had not been completed at the time the "Falaba" was torpedoed as hereinafter described. But about one-half of the crew consisted of men who had served on the previous voyage. These men would know their boat stations for they would retain the old stations allocated to them.

Boat drill on the Elder Dempster Line is held once a week, usually on the first Saturday or Sunday after the commencement of the voyage. The masters of the steamers are ordered by letter to see that the drill is repeated weekly, and to record it in the log. Competitions are also held between sailors, firemen, and stewards in swinging out, lowering, manning, and rowing the boats, and a money prize is awarded to the men of the successful boat. Particulars of these competitions are also entered in the log. No boat drill had been held on this voyage up to time when the "Falaba" was torpedoed.

The Captain and Officers.

The "Falaba" was under the command of Captain Davies. He had been for more than twenty years in the employment of Elder Dempster and Co. He lost his life when the ship went down.

Of the four officers three were making a voyage in the "Falaba" for the first time. The fourth had made a previous voyage in her.

Both the captain and the officers were competent and efficient men

The Crew.

The crew numbered 95. Of these 43 were old hands on the vessel, and the remaining 52 were new. The white members of the crew comprised four quartermasters, three A.B.'s, a boatswain, a carpenter, an ordinary seaman, and two deck boys. There were about 18 black sailors. The remainder of the crew consisted of engineers, firemen, and stewards. About one-half of the crew lost their lives when the "Falaba" went down. The crew was, in my opinion, efficient.

The Passengers.

There were 147 passengers on board, namely, 85 males and 7 females in the first-class and 55 males in the second-class. Of these passengers, 144 were of British nationality, one was Danish, one Greek and one American. There were no children on board.

The Cargo.

The cargo was loaded in the Liverpool Docks. It was a general cargo of the ordinary kind. It included 13 tons of cartridges and gunpowder for Government use on the West Coast. This was not more than is usually carried in peace time.

The "Falaba" unarmed.

The "Falaba" was not armed. She carried no means either of defence or of offence.

The Torpedoing of the "Falaba."

In the following narrative ship's time is given throughout.

The "Falaba" started from the Mersey on her voyage to Sierra Leone and other West African ports at 6 p.m. on Saturday the 27th of March last.

On the morning of Sunday the 28th March, Mr. Baxter, the chief officer, and Mr. Pengilly, the third officer, were on watch on the bridge.

The captain was in the chart room.

At 11.40 a.m., Mr. Pengilly sighted a submarine three miles off and about two points abaft the starboard beam. She was flying what Mr. Pengilly took to be a British ensign. The only other craft in sight was a steam drifter, the "Eileen Emma," which was at some distance.

At this time the course of the "Falaba" was S. 36° W. by compass, her speed was 12 to 13 knots, and her position $51^{\circ} 32'$ N. lat. and $6^{\circ} 36'$ W. long. She was about 60 miles west of St. Ann's Head. There was a choppy sea which was becoming worse.

Mr. Pengilly at once reported the submarine to Mr. Baxter, and he summoned the captain to the bridge.

The captain immediately altered the course of the "Falaba" so as to get the submarine directly astern, and at the same time he rang up the engine room to increase the speed. The best was done in the engine-room to respond to this call, but it was found impossible to effect any material improvement in the short time available.

The captain then sent Baxter to instruct the Marconi operator to signal all stations as follows:—"Submarine overhauling us. Flying British flag. $51^{\circ} 32'$, $6^{\circ} 36'$." This message was sent out at 11.50 a.m. Baxter then obtained a telescope and observed that the submarine was flying a German ensign. It is, in my opinion, uncertain whether the ensign had been changed or whether the ensign already observed was not, in fact, a German flag. The point, however, is not material, because from the first the captain believed the submarine to be an enemy craft.

The submarine was at this time making about 18 knots and was rapidly overhauling the "Falaba." Shortly before noon she fired a detonating signal to call attention, and by flags signalled the "Falaba" to "stop and abandon ship." The "Falaba" did not stop, but still manoeuvred to keep the submarine astern. The submarine then signalled "Stop, or I fire." The Captain and the Chief Officer then conferred, and decided that it was impossible to escape. They accordingly rang to the engine room to stop the engines. The signal "Stop, or I fire" was given a minute or two before noon. The submarine then signalled "Abandon ship immediately," and hailed through a megaphone to the "Falaba" to take to the boats as they were going "to sink the ship in five minutes." The Captain answered that he was taking to the boats. The Marconi operator heard the hail, and sent a second message "Position $51^{\circ} 32'$ N. $6^{\circ} 36'$ W. torpedo going boats." The warning that the submarine was going to sink the ship in five minutes was given as nearly as possible at noon.

The "Falaba" stopped at 12.4 or 12.5, and at 12.10 the submarine fired a torpedo into her. At this moment the submarine was within about 100 yards of the "Falaba." The torpedo struck the "Falaba" on the starboard side by No. 3 hatch aft of No. 1 life-boat and just alongside the Marconi house.

The blow was fatal. The "Falaba" at once took a list to starboard, and in eight minutes (namely at 12.18) she sank. This was within 20 minutes of the notice from the submarine of her intention to sink the ship.

An affidavit by Mr. Baxter the Chief Officer which has been put in has satisfied me that no rocket or other signals were fired or shown from the "Falaba" on the 28th March.

I do not desire, nor am I in this case required, to find whether the submarine was within her rights as an enemy craft in sinking the "Falaba." But I do assume that in any event she was bound to afford the men and women on board a reasonable opportunity of getting to the boats and of saving their lives. This, those in charge of the submarine did not do. And so grossly insufficient was the opportunity in fact afforded, that I am driven to the conclusion that the Captain of the submarine desired and designed not merely to sink the ship but, in doing so, also to sacrifice the lives of the passengers and crew.

There was evidence before me of laughing and jeering on board the submarine while the men and women from the "Falaba" were struggling for their lives in the water; but I prefer to keep silence on this matter in the hope that the witness was mistaken.

Orders to Passengers and Crew.

Between the first signal of the submarine to stop and the actual stopping of the "Falaba" the chief officer directed the first and second stewards to assemble the passengers on deck and to tell them to put on their life-belts. The captain also sent the fourth officer below to see that these orders were carried out.

After the engines were stopped the chief engineer and the third engineer ordered all men in the engine-room and stoke-hole on deck, and the order was obeyed.

Orders to Man the Boats.

By the time the "Falaba" was stopped a large number of the passengers were already on the boat deck. The captain was on the bridge. He sent the third officer and the quartermaster to see to the lowering and the filling of the boats, and the order to man the boats was passed round the ship.

The condition of the Life-boats when the Order to lower was given.

During the course of the Enquiry serious complaints were made by some of the witnesses both as to the condition of the boats and as to the launching of them. These complaints were put forward quite honestly although in some instances they came from passengers who are now preferring claims against the owners for compensation. I will take the charge against the boats first: it is the more important. It was said of them that they were "rotten." Now the four large life-boats, Nos. 1, 2, 3 and 4, were all built in 1906 by the builders of the ship herself, and they had all seen exactly the same service. Two of them, Nos. 3 and 4, were filled and were got away from the "Falaba" safely. They were in the water some hours, and were instrumental in saving about 80 persons. One of them, No. 1, was seriously damaged while being launched, and after reaching the water opened out and went adrift. The other, No. 2, was also seriously damaged while being launched, but she remained afloat, and, in fact, picked up a number of persons from the water and put them on board a trawler. Mr. Ralston, the naval architect of the builders, was called before me. He satisfied me that the materials used in building the four boats in 1906 were good, and the workmanship proper. He also told me that such boats are estimated to last 14 or 15 years.

It appears that the two boats which got away safely (Nos. 3 and 4) were washed up on the rocks of the coast of Cornwall in April, 1915, and were there seen and examined by Mr. Cotterell, the Assistant Marine Superintendent of Elder Dempster & Co., on the 20th of that month. He found at the same time and in the same locality the Captain's gig (No. 7) and one of the surf life-boats (No. 8). The gig had been washed up on the beach, but the surf boat (No. 8) had been picked up at sea by a trawler and brought in to Padstow to be repaired. Mr. Cotterell found the four boats, 3, 4, 7, 8, quite sound as to their timbers, but, of course, damaged. These four boats were again seen and examined in the month of May: on this occasion by Mr. Camps, a member of the Institute of Naval Architects, who had been sent for the purpose to Cornwall by the owners. When Mr. Camps arrived he found that another of the surf boats, namely, No. 6, had been washed up on the rocks, so that he was able to examine five of the boats—Nos. 3, 4, 6, 7, and 8. He gave me a description of the damage sustained by each of these boats. It was all damage attributable to rough usage of one kind or another. The timbers were in all cases quite sound. As to Nos. 3, 4, and 6, the structural damage was probably due to contact with the rocks. No. 7 (the gig) was not badly damaged, and was quite repairable. No. 8 had a hole smashed into her side two feet square. This hole Mr. Camps ascribes to the boat having been rammed against the side of the "Falaba" by the force of the explosion of the torpedo, and I am of opinion that he is right.

I recall that all the life-boats (seven) were surveyed at Liverpool by the Board of Trade surveyor as recently as December, 1914, and also that they were examined at the commencement of the voyage in question by Captain Thompson, the Marine Superintendent of the owners, and found on both occasions to be in good condition and fit for the intended service.

It also appears that a sister ship to the "Falaba"—namely, the "Elmira," was built by Messrs. Stephens & Sons, of Glasgow, at the same time as the "Falaba," and was provided with life-boats similar to those furnished to the "Falaba." Those boats have been examined by Mr. Camps within the last few days, and have been found quite sound. This evidence of skilled and apparently careful men satisfies

me that the witnesses who describe the boats as having been "rotten" are mistaken and that, in truth, the boats were sound and in good order up to the time of the attack by the submarine.

What, however, the witnesses probably mean when they say the boats were rotten is that when afloat some of them were found to be unseaworthy. And this, no doubt, is true. But this condition of things was, in my opinion, wholly due to the damage sustained by the boats after the operation of launching began, and not to any previous defect. Upon the subject of the launching, it is, therefore, necessary to say a few words. It is to be remembered that the submarine had given the "Falaba" only about five minutes in which to man, to fill, and to launch these boats: in which, in short, to save the lives of 242 persons. This was an operation quite incapable of efficient performance in anything like that short space of time. There was unavoidable hurry and disorder; the falls of one of the boats slipped; the falls of another jammed; some boats were dashed against the side of the ship and damaged; one (No. 8) was seriously injured by the explosion of the torpedo while still hanging from the davits. It is in these circumstances that some of the witnesses apparently desire me to find that the damage done to the boats was due to the neglect of the officers and crew in connection with the launching. I cannot do this. I have no doubt that had there been more time for the work it might have been better carried out, but, in my opinion, all on board, Captain, officers, crew and passengers, did their very best. People were fighting for their lives and for the lives of others about them, and in the struggle the Captain, half the crew, and a large number of the passengers were drowned. It is impossible for me to fix any man on board the ship with a failure of duty or with incompetence. The responsibility for the consequences of this catastrophe must rest exclusively with the officers and crew of the German submarine.

The Deaths.

Out of the 242 persons on board, 138 were saved and 104 were lost. Those lost were made up of 57 of the passengers and of 47 of the crew.

The Drifter "Eileen Emma" and the trawlers.

Most of the people saved were picked up from the water or taken from the boats by the master and crew of the "Eileen Emma," a drifter.

Others were taken on board the trawlers "Orient II.," "Wenlock," "George Baker" and "Emulate," which arrived on the scene after the "Falaba" had sunk.

The men on board all those five fishing boats behaved with great courage and kindness and deserve the highest commendation.

FINDING OF THE COURT.

It is now convenient to answer the twenty-five questions submitted by the Board of Trade.

1. When the s.s. "Falaba" left Liverpool on the 27th March last: (a) What was the total number of persons employed in any capacity on board her and what were their respective ratings? (b) What was the total number of her passengers, distinguishing sexes and classes and discriminating between adults and children?

Answer:

(a) The total number of persons employed in any capacity on board the "Falaba" was 95.

Their ratings were:—

Master and five deck officers	6
6 engineers	6
12 deck hands	12
2 pursers	2
14 firemen and 7 trimmers	21
34 stewards and 1 stewardess	35
1 Marconi operator and 2 clerks	3
Cooks, &c.	10
Total	95

(b) The total number of passengers was 147. Of these:—

—	Male.	Female.	Total.
1st Class	...	85	
2nd Class	...	55	
		—	147

Of the above, none were children.

2. Before leaving Liverpool on the 27th March last, did the "Falaba" comply with the requirements of the Merchant Shipping Acts, 1894 to 1906, and the Rules and Regulations made thereunder with regard to the safety and otherwise of passenger steamers?

Answer:

Yes.

3. Was the s.s. "Falaba" sufficiently officered and manned?

Answer:

Yes.

4. (a) What was the number of boats of any kind on board the s.s. "Falaba"? (b) Were the arrangements for manning and launching the boats on board the "Falaba" in case of emergency proper and sufficient? (c) What was the carrying capacity of the respective boats? (d) Had a boat drill been held on board before the vessel left Liverpool, and, if so, when?

Answer:

- (a) 4 life-boats.
3 surf life-boats.
1 Captain's gig.
- (b) Yes.
- (c) The carrying capacity of the 4 life-boats and the 3 surf life-boats was for 282 persons. Captain's gig was for 25 persons, or a total of 307 persons.
- (d) No, but see p. 4 of Report.

5. What number of life-jackets for adults and children and life-buoys did the vessel carry? Where were they kept, and were they fit and ready for use when the vessel left Liverpool?

Answer:

The number of life-jackets was 301, of which 19 were for children. The number of life-buoys was 12.

Yes.

6. Were any, and if so how many, and which of the boats carried swung-out board on leaving Liverpool?

Answer:

The 4 large life-boats (Nos. 1, 2, 3 and 4) and the captain's gig (No. 7) were swung out before the pilot left the "Falaba" on the evening of 27th March.

7. At what time on March 28th last was the German submarine first sighted by those on board the "Falaba" and what were the approximate positions of the two vessels at that time? Were any other vessels in sight at this time, and if so what were they, and what were their relative positions as regards the s.s. "Falaba" and the German submarine?

Answer:

The submarine was first sighted at 11.40 a.m.

The position of the "Falaba" was approximately 51° 32' N. latitude and 6° 36' W. longitude.

The position of the submarine was three miles off the "Falaba" and about two points abaft the starboard beam.

The only other vessel in sight was a steam drifter, the "Eileen Emma," which was at some distance from the "Falaba" and astern of the submarine.

8. What flag or flags were being displayed by the "Falaba" at the time the German submarine was first sighted and thereafter?

Answer:

None.

9. What flag or flags (if any) were displayed or shown by the German submarine (a) At the time she was first sighted, (b) At any time thereafter? Did the German submarine carry any distinguishing number or marks by which her identity could be established?

Answer:

(a) A white ensign, but see page 5 of Report.

(b) The German white ensign.

No distinguishing number or marks were observed.

10. What signals were made by the German submarine? At what times were they made? Was any answer made by the s.s. "Falaba" to such signals?

Answer:

See p. 5 of Report.

11. At what time were the engines of the "Falaba" stopped?

Answer:

One minute or two before noon.

REPORT.

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12. How near to the "Falaba" did the submarine approach? Were any verbal directions or messages given by anyone on board her to the "Falaba"? If so what were they? What answer (if any) was made to them by anyone on board the "Falaba"?

Answer:

One hundred yards.

Yes. The submarine hailed through a megaphone to the "Falaba" to take to the boats as they were going to sink the ship in five minutes. The Captain of the "Falaba" answered that he was taking to the boats.

13. What orders, if any, were given by the master of the "Falaba" after sighting the German submarine as to sending out wireless messages from his vessel? What wireless messages were, in fact, sent out from the "Falaba" and at what times were they sent out?

Answer:

See page 5 of Report.

The message "Submarine overhauling us. Flying British flag No. 51° 32' 6° 36'" was sent at 11.50 a.m.

The second message, "position 51° 32' N., 6° 36' W., torpedo going boats" was sent about noon.

14. Was the "Falaba" sunk by a torpedo fired by a German submarine?

Answer:

Yes.

15. At what time and from what distance away was the torpedo fired by the German submarine? At the time the torpedo was fired had all the crew and passengers of the "Falaba" left the ship in the boats? Were those on board the German submarine in a position to see clearly the position of affairs on board the "Falaba" at the time the torpedo was fired? What other ships (if any) were in the vicinity of the "Falaba" at the time the torpedo was fired?

Answer:

About 100 yards.

No.

Yes.

The steam-drifter "Eileen Einma," see page 5 of Report.

16. Where did the torpedo strike the "Falaba"? When it exploded what was the result (a) to the ship, (b) to any of her boats which were being, or about to be lowered, (c) to any passengers and crew then in the boats or in the water near the ship or on the ship?

Answer:

The torpedo struck the "Falaba" on the starboard side by No. 3 hatch aft of No. 1 life-boat and alongside the Marconi house.

(a) The "Falaba" at once took a list to starboard and sank in 8 minutes.

(b) See pages 6, 7 of Report.

(c) No evidence but a surmise by witness Bathgate that the concussion killed some of the people in the boats or in the water.

17. For how long after firing the torpedo did the German submarine remain in the vicinity of the "Falaba"? Did those on board her make any effort to render assistance in saving life? If not, could they have done so?

Answer:

Till the "Falaba" sank.

No.

Probably not, without endangering the submarine.

18. For how long after being struck by the torpedo did the "Falaba" remain afloat?

Answer:

Eight minutes.

19. When were orders given by the Master of the "Falaba" to get out the boats and leave the ship? Were such orders promptly carried out and was proper discipline maintained. Were the boats swung out filled, lowered or otherwise put into the water and got away under proper superintendence?

Answer:

About noon and after the order to stop the engines.

Yes.

Yes.

20. How many and which boats were successfully lowered and sent away? What number of (a) Crew, (b) Passengers were in each of these boats? To how many and which boats did accidents happen whilst they were being got out or being lowered or when in the water? What were the nature and causes of such accident? What number of passengers and crew were in each boat at the time? What loss of life (if any) occurred by reason of the accidents to these boats?

Answer:

Life-boats Nos. 3 and 4, see page 6 of Report.

See pages 6, 7 of Report.

21. Were all the boats efficient and serviceable for the purpose of saving life?

Answer:

Yes.

22. Before firing the torpedo, what time was given by the Commander of the German submarine to the Master of the "Falaba" to get all on board into the boats and leave the ship safely? Was such time reasonable?

Answer:

See page 5 of Report.

23. How many persons on board the "Falaba" on the occasion in question were saved, and by what means? What was the number of passengers, distinguishing between men and women and adults and children of the first and second class respectively, who were saved? What was the number of the crew, discriminating their ratings and sexes, who were saved?

Answer:

138 persons were saved; of whom 90 were passengers, of whom 6 were females.

No evidence of class of survivors.

Of the crew, there were 48 survivors, of whom all were males.

24. What was the cause of the loss of the s.s. "Falaba" and the loss of life?

Answer:

Damage to the "Falaba," caused by a torpedo fired by a German submarine, whereby the ship sank.

25. Is blame attributable to Mr. John Craig, Registered Manager, Mr. William Peter Thompson, Marine Superintendent, and Mr. Walter Campbell Baxter, Chief Officer, or to any, and, if so, which of them?

Answer:

No. .

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